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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                     
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 This appeal requires us to apply the confidentiality 
provisions of the Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-42 
("the Act").  We hold that the Act gives district judges 
authority to regulate access to the record of proceedings under 
the Act on a case-by-case basis through a balancing of interests. 
 
I.   
 A.D. and T.Y., juveniles, were arrested in connection 
with gang-related armed robberies of Pittsburgh-area convenience, 
clothing, and food stores.  To initiate federal juvenile 
delinquency proceedings against A.D. and T.Y., the United States 
filed informations.  The government also sought to detain A.D. 
and T.Y., so detention hearings were scheduled before a 
magistrate.  PG Publishing Co., publisher of the Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette, learned that the government would seek to close the 
detention hearings and appeared before the magistrate to object. 
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After hearing from the Post-Gazette, the government, and the 
juveniles, the magistrate closed the detention hearings on the 
ground that the Act mandates closure of all federal juvenile 
delinquency proceedings. 
          Following the detention hearings, the Post-Gazette 
filed motions to intervene in the two delinquency proceedings, as 
well as a motion to open the record of the detention hearings and 
to hold all further proceedings in open court.  Tribune-Review 
Publishing Co., publisher of the Tribune-Review, filed similar 
motions. 
 In support of their motions, the newspapers argued that 
the Act does not mandate closed proceedings and records and that, 
in any event, the First Amendment requires the district court to 
make a discretionary determination on the need for 
confidentiality on a case-by-case basis.  The government argued 
that the Act mandates closed proceedings and records and that the 
Constitution permits closure.  A.D. and T.Y. also argued in favor 
of closure.  The district judge granted the motions to intervene 
but denied the motions to open the proceedings and to unseal the 
records.  The newspapers filed this timely appeal.0   
                     
0Before this opinion was published, the proceedings against A.D. 
and T.Y. apparently concluded and the outcomes were reported in 
the press.  See Mike Bucsko, 15 years for armed robber, 18, 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Dec. 17, 1993, at B12.  We nevertheless 
find that this case is not moot.  The newspapers sought not only 
access to the court proceedings but also to the record of the 
proceedings, and such relief could still be granted.   
 
 In addition, we are of the opinion that the dispute 
between the newspapers and the government over access to juvenile 
proceedings is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 
Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 
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II. 
 Under the Act, persons who violate the laws of the 
United States before reaching their eighteenth birthday may be 
subject to federal juvenile delinquency proceedings, provided 
that proceedings against them begin before their twenty-first 
birthday.  §§ 5031-32.  Provision is made for representation by 
counsel, § 5034, custody prior to disposition, §§ 5033 & 5035, 
and speedy trials, § 5036.  After a juvenile is adjudged 
delinquent, a dispositional hearing is held, and the juvenile may 
be committed to official detention, placed on probation, or 
ordered to make restitution.  § 5037(a).  Observation and study 
of the juvenile can also be ordered.  § 5037(d).  Juveniles 
cannot be jailed with adults, and must be provided adequate 
facilities, care, and treatment.  § 5039.  Juveniles suspected of 
engaging in certain conduct may be subject to criminal 
prosecution as adults.  § 5032. 
 The Act also contains several confidentiality 
provisions, which are at issue in this case.  The first of these, 
§ 5032, provides in relevant part:   
                                                                  
U.S. 498, 515 (1911).  "[I]n the absence of a class action, the 
'capable of repetition, yet evading review' doctrine [is] limited 
to the situation where two elements combined:  (1) the challenged 
action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior 
to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable 
expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to 
the same action again."  Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 
(1975).  Both elements combined in this case -- the newspapers 
promptly sought access to the juvenile court proceedings, but 
were unable to complete litigation before the proceedings 
terminated, and other proceedings against other juveniles almost 
certainly will follow, to which the newspapers are again likely 
to seek access.  
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. . . any proceedings against [an alleged 
juvenile delinquent] shall be in an 
appropriate district court of the United 
States.  For such purposes, the court may be 
convened at any time and place within the 
district, in chambers or otherwise. . . .  
 
The second disputed provision, § 5038, provides in relevant part: 
(a) Throughout and upon completion of the 
juvenile delinquency proceedings, the records 
shall be safeguarded from disclosure to 
unauthorized persons.  The records shall be 
released to the extent necessary to meet the 
following circumstances: 
 
(1) inquiries received from another 
court of law; 
 
(2) inquiries from an agency 
preparing a presentence report for 
another court; 
 
(3) inquiries from law enforcement 
agencies where the request for 
information is related to the 
investigation of a crime or a 
position within that agency; 
 
(4) inquiries, in writing, from the 
director of a treatment agency or 
the director of a facility to which 
the juvenile has been committed by 
the court; 
 
(5) inquiries from an agency 
considering the person for a 
position immediately and directly 
affecting the national security; 
and 
  
(6) inquiries from any victim of such 
juvenile delinquency, or if the victim 
is deceased from the immediate family of 
such victim, related to the final 
disposition of such juvenile by the 
court in accordance with section 5037. 
   
Unless otherwise authorized by this section, 
information about the juvenile record may not 
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be released when the request for information 
is related to an application for employment, 
license, bonding, or any civil right or 
privilege.  Responses to such inquiries shall 
not be different from responses made about 
persons who have never been involved in a 
delinquency proceeding. 
 
* * * 
  
(c) During the course of any juvenile 
delinquency proceeding, all information and 
records relating to the proceeding, which are 
obtained or prepared in the discharge of an 
official duty by an employee of the court or 
an employee of any other government agency, 
shall not be disclosed directly or indirectly 
to anyone other than the judge, counsel for 
the juvenile and the Government, or others 
entitled under this section to receive 
juvenile records. 
 
 * * *  
 
(e) Unless a juvenile who is taken into 
custody is prosecuted as an adult neither the 
name nor picture of any juvenile shall be 
made public in connection with a juvenile 
delinquency proceeding. 
 
III. 
 The government argues that these confidentiality 
provisions mandate the closure of all juvenile proceedings and 
the sealing of all records.  We decline the newspaper's 
invitation to decide whether this construction of the Act is 
consistent with the First Amendment.  Nevertheless, we start with 
the proposition that the task of statutory interpretation we here 
face implicates First Amendment values and that the government's 
construction of the Act raises a substantial constitutional 
question. 
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 The First Amendment provides a right of public access 
in both civil and criminal cases.0  We have catalogued the 
interests protected by that right in the context of criminal 
proceedings:  
 
First, public access to criminal proceedings 
promotes informed discussion of governmental 
affairs by providing the public with a more 
complete understanding of the judicial 
system.  This public access and the knowledge 
gained thereby serve an important educative 
interest.  Second, public access to criminal 
proceedings gives the assurance that the 
proceedings were conducted fairly to all 
concerned and promotes the public perception 
of fairness.  Public confidence in and 
respect for the judicial system can be 
achieved only by permitting full public view 
of the proceedings.  Third, public access to 
criminal proceedings has a significant 
community therapeutic value because it 
provides an outlet for community concern, 
hostility, and emotion.  Fourth, public 
                     
0See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 3 
(1986) ("Press-Enterprise II") ("First Amendment right of access 
to the transcript of a preliminary hearing growing out of a 
criminal prosecution"); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of 
California, 464 U.S. 501, 508-10 (1984) ("Press-Enterprise I") 
(First Amendment values create presumption of openness for voir 
dire); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 
(1980) (plurality opinion ) ("the right to attend criminal trials 
is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment"); United 
States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 840 (3d Cir. 1994) ("the First 
Amendment right of access attaches to a post-trial hearing to 
investigate jury misconduct"); Republic of Philippines v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 659 (3d Cir. 1991) ("the 
First Amendment, independent of the common law, protects the 
public's right of access to the records of civil proceedings"); 
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 
1984) ("the First Amendment embraces a right of access to civil 
trials"); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 554 (3d Cir. 
1982) ("Criden II") ("the public has a first amendment right of 
access to pretrial suppression, due process, and entrapment 
hearings").  
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access to criminal proceedings serves as a 
check on corrupt practices by exposing the 
judicial process to public scrutiny, thus 
discouraging decisions based on secret bias 
or partiality.  Fifth, public access to 
criminal proceedings enhances the performance 
of all involved.  Finally, public access to 
criminal proceedings discourages perjury. 
 
United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 556 (3d Cir. 1982) 
("Criden II") (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)). 
 This "First Amendment right of access is not absolute." 
United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 840 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Competing values may warrant a denial of access to proceedings 
and records in some instances.  See Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) ("Press-Enterprise II"). 
Where there has been such a denial, whether resulting from 
legislative or judicial action, courts confronted with a First 
Amendment challenge ask whether the closure is "essential to 
preserve higher values" and "narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest."  Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 
510 (1984) ("Press-Enterprise I").  If an alternative would serve 
the interest well and intrude less on First Amendment values, a 
denial of public access cannot stand.  See United States v. 
Raffoul, 826 F.2d 218, 224-25 (3d Cir. 1987).  For this reason, 
the proponent of a legislatively imposed denial of access in a 
stipulated category of cases, where the trial judge is not free 
to weigh the competing interests on a case-by-case basis, has a 
difficult burden to carry. 
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 Juvenile courts have been created in every state during 
the last century.  See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-19 (1967). 
Recognizing the special sensitivity of information regarding 
juveniles and the impact that public dissemination of such 
information may have on the youths involved, states have devised 
a number of different approaches to accommodate these concerns. 
For the most part, these have not involved blanket prohibitions 
of access.  See Note, The Public Right of Access to Juvenile 
Delinquency Hearings, 81 Mich L. Rev. 1540, 1540 n.3 (1983).  It 
remains true, as the Supreme Court observed in 1967, that 
"[d]isclosure of court records is discretionary with the judge in 
most jurisdictions."  Gault, 387 U.S. at 24. 
 Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has had 
occasion to decide whether an across-the-board ban on access to 
juvenile proceedings would accord with the First Amendment.  The 
Supreme Court did address in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior 
Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1981), whether the First Amendment permits a 
statutory bar to public access to criminal trials during the 
testimony of minor victims of sex crimes.  The appellee urged 
that the statute served two compelling state interests:  "the 
protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and 
embarrassment; and the encouragement of victims to come forward 
and testify in a truthful and credible manner."  Id. at 607.  The 
Supreme Court acknowledged that both of these interests were 
compelling.  It held, however, that neither would justify an 
across-the-board ban on access in every instance involving a 
minor sex victim: 
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[A]s compelling as that interest [in 
protecting minor victims of sex crimes] is, 
it does not justify a mandatory closure rule, 
for it is clear that the circumstances of the 
particular case may affect the significance 
of the interest.  A trial court can determine 
on a case-by-case basis whether closure is 
necessary to protect the welfare of a minor 
victim.  Among the factors to be weighed are 
the minor victim's age, psychological 
maturity and understanding, the nature of the 
crime, and desires of the victim, and the 
interests of parents and relatives.  Section 
16A, in contrast, requires closure even if 
the victim does not seek the exclusion of the 
press and general public, and would not 
suffer injury by their presence. . . .  If 
the trial court [in the case before us] had 
been permitted to exercise its discretion, 
closure might well have been deemed 
unnecessary.  In short, § 16A cannot be 
viewed as a narrowly tailored means of 
accommodating the State's asserted interest: 
That interest could be served just as well by 
requiring the trial court to determine on a 
case-by-case basis whether the State's 
legitimate concern for the well-being of the 
minor victim necessitates closure.  Such an 
approach ensures that the constitutional 
right of the press and the public to gain 
access to criminal trials will not be 
restricted except where necessary to protect 
the State's interest. 
 
Id. at 607-08.  The Supreme Court added: 
 
 We emphasize that our holding is a 
narrow one: that a rule of mandatory closure 
respecting the testimony of minor sex victims 
is constitutionally infirm.  In individual 
cases, and under appropriate circumstances, 
the First Amendment does not necessarily 
stand as a bar to the exclusion from the 
courtroom of the press and general public 
during the testimony of minor sex-offense 
victims.  But a mandatory rule, requiring no 
particularized determinations in individual 
cases, is unconstitutional. 
Id. at 611, n.27. 
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 Globe is not controlling in this case.  It concerned 
criminal trials, which historically have been open to the press 
and general public.  See Globe, 596 U.S. at 605 ("when our 
organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in 
England had long been presumptively open") (quoting Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (plurality 
opinion)).  No centuries-old tradition of openness exists for 
juvenile proceedings, which are a relatively recent creation, and 
proceedings to determine whether a juvenile is a delinquent are 
not generally regarded as criminal proceedings.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1990) 
("Under [the Juvenile Delinquency Act], prosecution results in an 
adjudication of status, not a criminal conviction."). 
Nevertheless, the detention and delinquency proceedings called 
for in the Act are closely analogous to criminal proceedings, and 
all the public interests in criminal proceedings that we 
catalogued in Criden II, 675 F.2d at 556, seem present and 
equally cogent here.  Of equal importance, we cannot say that the 
countervailing interests that would be served by denying public 
access to proceedings under the Act are any more compelling than 
those that the Supreme Court acknowledged were being served by 
the challenged statute in Globe. 
 Thus, while Globe is not on all fours with the 
situation before us, it does suggest that an across-the-board ban 
on access to juvenile proceedings under the Act would pose a 
substantial constitutional issue.  Accordingly, we will apply the 
well established rule of statutory construction articulated in 
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DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 
568, 575 (1988): 
[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction 
of a statute would raise serious 
constitutional problems, the Court will 
construe the statute to avoid such problems 
unless such construction is plainly contrary 
to the intent of Congress.  Catholic Bishop, 
supra, at 499-501, 504.  This cardinal 
principle has its roots in Chief Justice 
Marshall's opinion for the Court in Murray v. 
The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804), 
and has for so long been applied by this 
Court that it is beyond debate. . . .  As was 
stated in Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 
657 (1895), "[t]he elementary rule is that 
every reasonable construction must be 
resorted to, in order to save a statute from 
unconstitutionality."  This approach not only 
reflects the prudential concern that 
constitutional issues not be needlessly 
confronted, but also recognizes that 
Congress, like this Court, is bound by and 
swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. 
Accordingly, in the absence of an unambiguous directive to the 
contrary, we are reluctant to attribute to Congress an intention 
to deprive district courts of discretion to strike on a case-by-
case basis the balance between the interests protected by the 
First Amendment and competing privacy interests.  When we examine 
the Act with care, we fail to find such a directive. 
 
IV. 
 We first focus on § 5032 and its provision that "court 
may be convened at any time and place within the district, in 
chambers or otherwise."  This provision, in our view, evidences a 
congressional expectation that district judges will exercise 
their discretion when they decide where to hold hearings under 
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the Act.  Moreover, the addition of "in chambers or otherwise" 
suggests that this discretion is to include a decision regarding 
the availability and degree of public access -- we can think of 
no other persuasive reason for the inclusion of this clause. 
Thus, to our minds, § 5032 provides strong evidence that Congress 
did not intend an across-the-board ban on public access to 
proceedings under the Act. 
 When we turn to § 5038(a), we find additional evidence 
for this proposition and implicit recognition that the court 
retains discretion with respect to access to judicial records. We 
read this section as directed to protection of the court's 
records "of the juvenile delinquency proceeding," including the 
transcript.0  As a result, we understand the term "released" to 
refer to action the court authorizes.  Section 5038(a) does not 
mandate denial of access to the records of a proceeding -- it 
provides only that such records be "safeguarded against 
disclosure to unauthorized persons."  § 5038(a) (emphasis 
supplied).  The court is barred from authorizing access only in 
those situations involving "information about the juvenile record 
. . . when the request for information is related to an 
application for employment, license, bonding or any civil right 
or privilege."  Even in these few situations singled out in the 
                     
0The focus on protecting the court's record was clearer under the 
version of § 5038(a) which existed prior to its amendment in 1984 
and provided that "the district court shall order the entire file 
and record of such proceeding sealed."  There is no suggestion in 
the text or legislative history of the 1984 amendment that the 
subject matter of this subsection was being changed.  See Sen. 
Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 387-93, reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3527-33. 
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last paragraph of § 5038(a), the court is required to release the 
information sought if the request comes from one of the entities 
described in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(6). 
       Section 5038(a) lists in paragraphs (a)(1) through 
(a)(6) the entities that have a right to access the records of 
the judicial proceeding on request, and, as we have noted, it 
specifies in its concluding paragraph a limited number of 
situations where disclosure is forbidden.  It does not, however, 
further define or limit the concepts of authorized and 
unauthorized persons.  Most importantly, § 5038(a) implicitly 
recognizes that there are situations other than those described 
in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(6) and its concluding paragraph 
in which access could be authorized.  If Congress intended 
paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(6) to constitute an exclusive list 
of the situations in which access would be authorized, the 
concluding paragraph would be superfluous; if access was to be 
foreclosed in all but the situations described in 
paragraphs(a)(1) through (a)(6), the prohibition against 
disclosure in connection with applications for employment, 
licenses, bonding and civil rights would not have been necessary. 
 Section 5038(c), as we read it, has a different and 
more specific target than § 5038(a) -- information and documents 
"obtained or prepared" by an employee of the court or of another 
government agencies in the line of duty.  The Act provides ample 
evidence of Congress' recognition that the district court would 
need information gathered by others in order to perform its 
responsibilities successfully.  Section 5032, for example, lists 
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a number of factors that the court must consider in determining 
whether to transfer a juvenile for criminal prosecution as an 
adult:  "the age and social background of the juvenile; the 
nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the 
juvenile's prior delinquency record; the juvenile's present 
intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature 
of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such 
efforts; the availability of programs designed to treat the 
juvenile's behavioral problems."  Section 5032 goes on to 
stipulate that "any proceedings against a juvenile . . . shall 
not be commenced until the prior juvenile records of such 
juvenile have been received by the court [or their unavailability 
explained]."  Other provisions of the Act authorize the 
commitment of the juvenile "for observation and study by the 
appropriate agency," and require an examination of the juvenile's 
"personal traits, his capabilities, his background, any previous 
delinquency or criminal experience, and mental or physical 
defect, and any other relevant factors."  § 5038(d).   
 We read § 5038(c) as directed to the protection of the 
fruits of the labors of the government employees who "obtain and 
prepare" this information.  Some of this information will be 
contained in documents maintained in locations other than the 
Office of the Court Clerk, such as the files of the United States 
Attorney and the United States Probation Office.  To this extent, 
§ 5038(c) is broader than § 5038(a).  We do not suggest that 
§5038(c) applies to bar the media from publishing anything they 
legally obtain.  See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 
19 
97 (1979); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 
308 (1977).  It does, however, bar anyone associated with a 
proceeding under the Act, including the United States Attorney 
and the employees of any other law enforcement agency, from 
disclosing such information to unauthorized persons.  Because we 
read "others entitled under this section" to include persons 
authorized by the court to receive records under the authority 
implicitly recognized in § 5038(a), we believe § 5038(c) 
preserves the district court's discretion to weigh the juvenile's 
interest and the public's interest on a case-by-case basis. 
 Finally, we turn to § 5038(e).  The government argues, 
with some persuasive force, that the prohibition against making 
public the picture of any juvenile is inconsistent with a 
congressional intent to have public hearings in cases brought 
under the Act.  Those attending a public hearing necessarily 
would be exposed to the visual image of the juvenile involved 
unless elaborate and cumbersome precautions were taken. 
 A prohibition against making a juvenile's picture or 
name available to the public, however, strikes us as an indirect 
and unlikely way for Congress to stipulate that all hearings 
under the Act will be closed to the public.  State statutes that 
restrict access to juvenile proceedings generally do so directly 
and clearly.  Pennsylvania's delinquency law, for example, 
provides that "the general public shall be excluded," 42 P.S. 
20 
§6336(d),0 and Delaware's provides that "[a]ll proceedings before 
the court and all records of such proceedings may be private," 10 
Del. Code § 972(a).0    
 We think it far more likely that § 5038(e) was intended 
not to limit the discretion of trial judges to regulate access to 
juvenile delinquency proceedings, but to foreclose law 
enforcement officials from holding press conferences at which the 
name and picture of the juvenile would be "made public in 
connection with a juvenile delinquency proceeding."0  Section 
5038(e), then, like the rest of the Act, provides no evidence of 
a congressional mandate to close all juvenile delinquency 
hearings and seal all records.  
                     
0The official comment to the Pennsylvania statute adds that 
"[t]he statute as drawn permits the court in its discretion to 
admit news reporters."  
0Delaware's statute allows the court to open proceedings "to the 
extent that the Court may consider publication in the public 
interest" and adds that "proceedings in a crime classified as a 
felony shall be open to the public."  10 Del. Code Ann. § 972(a).  
0After A.D. and T.Y. were arrested, for example, authorities held 
a well-publicized press conference, see Michael A. Fuoco & Mike 
Bucsko, It's a federal case, gangs here warned:  7 charged in 
robberies facing U.S. law enforcement, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 
March 26, 1993, at A1, and a news release was issued by the U.S. 
Attorney, the FBI, the Allegheny County District Attorney, the 
Pittsburgh Police Chief, and the Pennsylvania Chief Deputy 
Attorney General.    
21 
V. 
 The government urges us to construe §§ 5032 and 5038 in 
light of the purpose and policy of the statutory scheme of which 
they are parts.  The purpose of the Juvenile Delinquency Act, the 
government stresses, "is to rehabilitate, not to punish."  In re 
Sealed Case, 893 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  To effectuate its 
rehabilitative purposes, the Act requires inquiry into the most 
sensitive aspects of a juvenile's life.  Public access, the 
government maintains, would embarrass and humiliate juveniles, 
make it difficult to obtain evidence about delicate matters, and 
adversely affect the rehabilitation of juveniles by publicly 
labelling them as criminals.  If §§ 5032 and 5038 were construed 
in accordance with this purpose and policy, the government 
asserts, public access to delinquency proceedings would be 
barred.  
 We, like the government, recognize the need to avoid 
embarrassing and humiliating juveniles, to obtain evidence about 
delicate matters, and not to affect the rehabilitation of 
juveniles adversely.  We are not convinced, however, that 
Congress found across-the-board closure of juvenile proceedings 
necessary to achieve these goals.  Rather, we think Congress left 
the delicate task of weighing the interests of the juvenile and 
the public to the informed discretion of the district judge in 
each case.  District judges are experienced at striking this kind 
of delicate balance in the first instance in the context of 
22 
common law and other First Amendment access cases.0  We are 
confident that, here as there, they will be sensitive to the 
interests of juveniles and faithful to the objectives of the Act, 
as they determine the degree to which there will be public access 
to proceedings under the Act and the records generated in those 
proceedings. 
 
VI. 
 The Act does not mandate closed hearings and sealed 
records in all situations.  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
order of the district court denying the newspapers' motions to 
                     
0The Supreme Court has stated that the common law provides a 
right of access to judicial records.  See Nixon v. Warner 
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-99 (1978).  There is also 
a "common-law rule of open civil . . . proceedings."  Gannett 
Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 384 (1979).  We discussed 
the "common law right of access" in United States v. Criden, 648 
F.2d 814, 823 (3d Cir. 1981) ("Criden I"), and in Publicker 
Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1066 (3d Cir. 1984), we 
noted that "[t]he existence of a common law right of access to 
judicial proceedings and to inspect judicial records is beyond 
dispute."  See also Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion 
Technologies, Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161-165 (3d Cir. 1993); 
Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 
653 (3d Cir. 1991); Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673 (3d 
Cir. 1988); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Hotel 
Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1986). 
     
 The Supreme Court has noted in common law access cases 
how difficult it is "to identify all the factors to be weighted 
in determining whether access is appropriate" and has suggested 
that "the decision as to access is one best left to the sound 
discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in 
light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular 
case."  Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599.  We have remarked on the need "to 
balance the strong public interest favoring access against 
legitimate privacy concerns" and observed  that "the trial court 
is generally given considerable leeway in the delicate balancing 
which must be performed."  Criden I, 648 F.2d at 829.   
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open the proceedings and to unseal the record.  We instruct the 
district court on remand to exercise its discretion concerning 
whether, and the extent to which, there should be public access 
to the records of these proceedings.0  Any denial or limitation 
of access must be supported by factual findings related to the 
circumstances of this particular case. 
  
                     
0As we have noted, the proceedings against A.D. and T.Y. 
apparently have concluded.  Accordingly, the district court need 
not exercise its discretion with respect to attendance at court 
hearings in those proceedings.  Separate consideration will have 
to be given in other cases to hearing access and to record file 
access.  There well may be situations in which a proper weighing 
of the public's interest and the interests of the juvenile will 
call for a denial of access to a hearing and nevertheless require 
access at a later point to the transcript of that hearing. 
